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VOLUME XI WINTER, 1957 NUMBER 1
TEXAS ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
-COMPARSION WITH FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWSt
by
Dan Moody* and Charles B. Wallace**
INTRODUCTION
A NTITRUST laws, state and federal, seem to become more and
more important as time moves on although the day of the "trust
buster" that brought these laws into being lies a half century in the
background. A statement of the antitrust laws of a state and of the
enforcement of them, compared with the federal statutes, may be
of interest.
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND'
Senator Sherman himself stated that his act had as "its single
object" to
. . . supplement the enforcement of the established rules of com-
mon and statute law by the courts of the several States in dealing
with combinations that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the
citizens of these States.
The senator evidently had in mind that the states would carry the
greater part of the burden of breaking up combinations in restraint of
trade.
Attorney General Javits further states that
Recent developments may have tended to obscure the fact that,
prior to the advent of the Sherman Act of 1890, antitrust policy in
this country was developed entirely by the common law and statutes
of the several states. Thus, in a recently published treatise, an eminent
t Based upon a speech delivered before the Section on Antitrust Law, American Bar
Association, Dallas, Texas, August 29, 1956.
*LL.B., University of Texas School of Law; Attorney General of Texas, 1925-1926;
Governor of Texas, 1927-1931; attorney, Austin, Texas.
** LL.B., Southern Methodist University School of Law; General Counsel, Magnolia
Petroleum Company, Dallas, Texas.
'Javits, The Role of State Antitrust Laws, ANTrnTusT LAW SYMPOSIUM-19S6, p. 56
(CCH).
'Speech in the United States Senate, March 21, 1890, 21 CONG. REc. 2456, 2457.
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authority on the subject states: "... the principles of common law
were applied and developed by the several states."' And again, still
speaking of the development of antitrust concepts before 1890, he
wrote:
"It must be remembered that, principally, all these doctrines
and concepts were applied by state, and not by federal, courts.
There was no federal common law, at least not in this field.""
Mr. Javits further stated that
Prior to the passage of the Sherman Act, the antitrust movement
had produced statutes in at least 13 states prohibiting monopolies, trusts,
and other devices designed to fix prices and restrain competition, most
of them enacted in the 1880's.
His further statement that
Although the impression still persists in some quarters that Middle
Western States were the leaders, the fact is that New York and Texas
far outstripped most of the other states during that era.'
indicates why Texas antitrust laws and cases were selected as a sub-
ject of this paper.
TEXAS ANTITRUST LAWS
The Texas antitrust laws consist of a part of Section 26 of Article
1, of the Texas Constitution, which was carried forward verbatim
from the Bill of Rights of the Republic of Texas, declaring that
"Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free
government, and shall never be allowed. . . " The antitrust statutes
are Articles 7426 to 7447, inclusive, of TEXAS REVISED CIVIL STAT-
UTES (1925) and Articles 1632 to 1644 of the TEXAS PENAL CODE.
In March of 1889 the Texas legislature enacted a statute prohibit-
ing trusts and conspiracies against trade. Much of the language and
a considerable part of the restrictions found in that act appear in the
Texas statute presently in force. It was among the first statutes
prohibiting trusts, monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade
enacted in this country.
The act of March 30, 1889, was replaced by an act of April 30,
1895. The new statute subjected a violator to a fine of not exceeding
five thousand dollars and imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or
either the fine or imprisonment. The criminal prosecutions under
Texas antitrust laws can be disposed of quickly.
So far as the authors are aware, from 1895 to date, only three in-
3 THORELLT, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 36 (1955).
4 Id. at $3.
'Id. at 263. 265.
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dictments have been returned for violation of the Texas antitrust
laws, one in 1896, one in about 1910 and another in about 1938. In
the first case the defendant was charged with conspiring with such
distinguished gentlemen as John D. Rockefeller, Henry Flagler and
H. Clay Pierce, all engaged in selling "coal oil." The defendant
Hathaway was convicted; on appeal the conviction was reversed and
the case ended there.
In the second case the defendant took leave of Texas and some
fifteen years later, the district attorney moved for the dismissal of
that indictment. In the third case the defendant was charged with
participating in a conspiracy to fix prices. On writ of habeas corpus
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held the penal statute valid
against the claim of a denial of equal protection, since the act excepted
from its terms "agricultural products or livestock while in the hands
of the producer or raiser." The defendant relied on Connolly v. Union
Sewer Pipe Co." On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter held that "Connolly's case has been worn away by the erosion
of time and we are of the opinion that it is no longer controlling."
The Texas statute was held valid against that attack, but the de-
fendant was never tried. It is supposed that the indictment has long
since been dismissed.
The authors would not advise any violation of the penal statutes on
antitrust, but it does appear that in Texas those charged with violation
of the penal statutes have fared far better than some of those who
have been sued for civil penalties.
In 1899 a statute was enacted prohibiting pools, trusts, monopolies
and conspiracies to control business and prices. This act, approved
May 25, 1899, was an extreme piece of legislation and, as is generally
true of such, in recodification of the statutes and repeals the act has
been lost to sight.
Another statute was enacted at the same session of the legislature
which had the effect to impose rather extreme penalties; it, like the
act last above referred to, has been tempered in the recodification of
the Texas statutes.
Other amendments have followed in 1903, 1907, 1909, 1917, 1919,
1923, 1931, and 1947, and changes have been made in the recodifica-
tion of the Texas statutes in 1911 and 1925. The Texas antitrust
statutes, civil and penal, through these changes appear to be fair and
reasonable.
6184 U.S. 540 (1902).
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The civil statutes prohibit trusts, monopolies and conspiracies in
restraint of trade," each of which is defined in the act. They de-
clare that any contract or agreement made in violation of such laws
shall be absolutely void and not enforceable either in law or equity.!
Penalties and procedures for enforcement are provided in the
statutes.
The criminal statutes likewise prohibit trusts, monopolies and con-
spiracies against trade and provide a penalty for violation. Agricul-
tural products and livestock while in the hands of the producer or
raiser, and trade unions of persons engaged in any kind of work or
labor9 are excepted from the statute. The Texas Supreme Court has
held that the penal and civil statutes, while they comprehend the
same general subject, are separate and distinct laws."0
Even before the enactment of these statutes, trusts and con-
tracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade were illegal if the re-
strictions were unreasonable and if the articles affected were of
prime necessity to the public." These statutes enlarged materially the
prohibitions of the common law."
Both the civil and criminal statutes dealing with antitrust are
"subject to the rules of strict construction.""
Trusts
A trust is defined by Article 7426 to be a "combination of capital,
skill or acts by two or more persons" for any or all of seven specified
purposes, including restricting the free pursuit of a business, fixing
prices, preventing or lessening competition in the manufacture, sale
or purchase of a commodity, and regulating the output of a com-
modity.
The types of contracts most frequently held to be in violation of
this article are those fixing the resale price of goods and those re-
stricting the territory in which the vendee may sell same.
If the facts specified in the statute exist, an unlawful intent
'Arts. 7426-7429. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (1925).
OArt. 7437. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. (1925).
9 Arts. 1632-1644, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).
"State v. Standard Oil Co.. 130 Tex. 313. 107 S.W. 2d 50 (1937).
"Queen Ins. Co. v. State. 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893), reversing 22 S.W. 1048
(Tex. Civ. App. 1393); State v. Racine Stately Co., 134 S.W. 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911);
29 TEx. JuR., Monopolies and Combinations § 2 (1942); 10 TEx. JuR., Contracts § 131
(1937).
"North Texas Gin Co. v. Thomas, 277 S.W. 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error ref.;
29 TEX. JuR., Monopolies and Combinations § 6 (1942).
"State v. Fairbanks-Morse Co., 246 S.W. 2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref., n.r.e.
(Vol. 11
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or motive is not required." Also, it is immaterial that the immediate
result of the combination may be a reduction of prices."
Although the actual sale of a commodity was in interstate com-
merce, an agreement pertaining to the vendee's handling of it after
its purchase affects intrastate commerce, and the taint of illegality
resulting from such agreement destroys the whole transaction."
It has been held that in order for a trust to exist there must be a
"combination" of two or more competitors, or at least of persons
capable of acting in competition with each other. 17 A corporation
cannot combine with its own officers, employees and agents."
Although this article expressly forbids resrictions in "aids to
commerce" as well as in trade or commerce, the "aids to commerce"
provision has received, and necessarily must receive, a very narrow
construction. It has been held that the statutes do not apply to con-
tracts involving such things as a plant for compiling abstracts of land
titles," an automobile hearse,"' or photo art calendars, 1 or to the
construction of a power plant.2
Monopolies
A monopoly is defined by Article 7427 as a combination or con-
solidation of two or more corporations when effected in either of
two ways:
(1) Bringing them under the same management or control for the
purpose of producing, or where the act tends to create, a trust as
defined in Article 7426; or
(2) Acquiring the shares, franchise or properties by one from
the other for the purpose of preventing or lessening, or where the
effect of the acquisition tends to effect or lessen competition.
This type of monopoly is not the monopoly condemned by the
Texas Constitution.' The monopoly referred to in the Constitution is
a common law monopoly--originally a grant of an exclusive privilege
14 29 TEx. JuR., Monopolies and Combinations § 8 (1942).
1San Antonio Gas Co. v. State. 54 S.W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) error ref.
'6 Fuqua v. Pabst Brewing Co., 90 Tex. 298, 38 S.W. 29, rehearing, 38 S.W. 750 (1896).
"7State v. Fairbanks-Morse Co., 246 S.W. 2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
n.r.e.; Gates v. Hooper. 90 Tex. 563, 39 S.W. 1079 (1897).
" Padgett v. Lone Star Gas Co.. 213 S.W. 2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
19Duggan Abstract Co. v. Moore, 139 S.W. 2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism.
judgm. cor.
'0 Dannel v. Sherman Transfer Co., 211 S.W. 297 (Tex. "Civ App. 1919).
" Forrest Photographic Co. v. Hutchinson Groc. Co.. 108 S.W. 768 (Tex. Civ. App.
1908).
" State v. Fairbanks-Morse Co.. 246 S.W. 2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). error ref. n.r.e.
"' 29 Txx. JuL., Monopolies and Combinations S 2 (1942).
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by the sovereign." But the constitutional provision is necessarily given
a reasonable construction, and does not forbid contracts which are not
in their express terms exclusive (although all others are precluded by
the very nature of the contract from enjoying the right granted),25
or contracts granting exclusive privileges upon the grantor's
premises."
The statutory monopoly applies only to corporations and not to
individuals." But it does apply to corporations acting through trustees
or others."
Mere ownership is not forbidden if the result does not create or
tend to create a trust, or to lessen competition.29
Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade
By Article 7428 any of the following acts are declared to be a
conspiracy in restraint of trade:
(1) An agreement by two or more persons to refuse to buy from
or sell to any other person;
(2)An agreement to boycott or to threaten to refuse to buy from
or sell to any other person; and
(3) An agreement to boycott or to refuse to transport, deliver,
use or work with products of any other person.
This statute hits particularly at agreements to buy from or sell to
one person exclusively. It has been held in a recent case that this
article contemplates an agreement between two concerns both of
whom are at the time engaged in buying and selling, and does not
apply where one of the parties is the ultimate consumer."
The Supreme Court has expressly declared that a manufacturer
may at its pleasure sell, or refuse to sell, to any person;" it has also
been held that evidence of a refusal to sell does not establish a con-
spiracy.2
24 Macdonnell v., I. & G.N. Ry. Co., 60 Tex. 590 (1884); City of Brenham v. Brenham
Water Co., 67 Tex. 542, 4 S.W. 143 (1887).
2"State v. Central Power & Light Co., 139 Tex. 51, 161 S.W. 2d. 766 (1942), affirm-
ing 147 S.W. 2d. 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); 29 TEx. JuR., Monopolies and Combinations
§ 4 (1942).
26 Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. State, 99 Tex. 34, 87 S.W. 336 (1905); Smith v. Lane,
236 S.W. 2d. 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Jeanes v. Burke, 226 S.W. 2d. 908 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950).
TNickels v. Prewitt Auto Co., 149 S.W. 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
" Langford v. Power, 196 S.W. 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
29 State v. Swift & Co.. 187 S.W. 2d. 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.
30 State v. Fairbanks-Morse Co., 246 S.W. 2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
n.r.e.
at Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 230 (1943), Affirming 169 S.W.
2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).32 Jax Beer Co. v. Palmer, 150 S.W. 2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
(Vol. I1I
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Certain conspiracies or agreements in restraint of trade were un-
lawful before the enactment of the antitrust laws. Some of those
agreements or conspiracies, although not covered by the antitrust
laws, are probably still illegal." However, it is believed that neither
civil nor criminal penalties can be recovered in connection with
them. A restraining injunction appears to be the only remedy.
Selling Below Cost
Article 1638 of the TEXAS PENAL CODE, for which there is no
counterpart in the civil statutes, makes it unlawful to sell at less than
cost of manufacture, or give away, or give secret rebates for the
purpose of driving out competition or financially injuring com-
petitors engaged in a similar business.
Penalties
Violations of the antitrust laws may be punished by the State of
Texas by civil and criminal sanctions, and persons who have been
damaged by such violations may maintain actions for the recovery of
the damages sustained by them as a result of such violations.
The attorney general may restrain violations by injunction; or he
may recover money penalties under the civil statutes ranging from
$50 to $1,500 per day for each day of violation; or he may demand
that the charters of domestic corporations and the permits of foreign
corporations be forfeited. After a domestic corporation thus loses its
charter, neither it nor its successor or transferee will afterwards be
permitted to incorporate or do business in Texas. A foreign cor-
poration which has lost its permit must wait five years and comply
with the provisions of Article 7435 before it can again do business
in Texas. The punishment for violating the criminal statutes is con-
finement in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than
ten years.
COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND TEXAS ANTITRUST LAWS
The federal acts are cast in the most general terms; the generality
of the language is a boon to the prosecutor, civil or criminal, and
a plague to the defendant. The Texas statutes speak in terms of
"thou shall not." Both the civil and criminal statutes outlaw trusts
5
(seven specific kinds of combinations of capital, skill, and acts),
3 3 State v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Tex. 313, 107 S.W. 2d 550 (1937).
34See State v. Central Power & Light Co., 139 Tex. 51, 161 S.W. 2d 766 (1942),
holding that penalties cannot be recovered for violation of the constitutional provision
against monopolies.
"
5 Art. 7426, TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. (1925); Art. 1632, TEx. PEN. CODE (1925).
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monopoliess" (two specific kinds of combinations or consolidations of
corporations), and conspiracies against trade"7 (three specific classes
of agreements such as boycotts, refusal to deal, etc.), and Article
1638 of the TEXAS PENAL CODE, which has no counterpart in our
civil statutes, prohibits giving away merchandise, or giving secret
rebates to injure competition.
Rule of Reason
While the United States Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States" liberally interpreted the prohibitions of the Sherman
Act against every contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade to mean only such acts as unreasonably restrained trade, never-
theless, on this federal "rule of reason" ("standard of reason") has
been engrafted the exception set forth in the "Madison" case" to the
effect that it is per se violation of the law to tamper with price
structures, raise, depress, fix, peg, or stabilize prices, and the court
will allow no inquiry into the reasonableness of the act, even though
the public as a whole is benefited."°
While now and then the statement is made that Texas professes
to have no "rule of reason," it is a fact that both our civil and
criminal courts have given these statutes a reasonable interpretation."'
It is a fact that our able attorneys general have, in nearly every in-
stance, attempted to prosecute only such acts they at least believe to
be real, substantial and clear violations of our laws. Actually, our
Texas antitrust laws, as an exercise of the police power, must be rea-
sonably applied both by the legislature and by the courts; otherwise
they would be unconstitutional.'
Aids to Commerce
The Texas act declares illegal any combination of capital, skill or
acts which create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce or
aids to commerce. Some highly competent lawyers have construed it
to declare illegal combinations of capital, skill or acts to create or
carry out aids to commerce. So construed, if this provision of Article
7426 is not unconstitutional, it is so senseless as to be unenforceable.
3"Art. 7427, TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (1925); Art. 1633, TEx. PEN. CODE (1925).
37 Art. 7428, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. (1925); Art. 1634, TEx. PEN. CODE (1925).
3'221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
"United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221, 223 (1940).
40 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
" For example, sales of business and good will with an agreement not to compete, exclu-
sive sales agreements at one location, etc.
429 TEX. JuR., Constitutional Law S 80 (1941); Neel v. Texas Liquor Control Board
259 S.W. 2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
(Vol. 11I
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It is difficult to say that statutes erode through the lapse of time, but
fifty years of atrophy have dulled this threat to any form of com-
mercial activity. Does it outlaw all partnerships? Literally interpeted,
it would give one pause in assisting the blind, aged or crippled pur-
chaser across a crowded street. What about chambers of commerce
in this state? Their avowed purpose is to "aid commerce."
Antimerger Laws
Since 1914 the Clayton Act" has prohibited corporations in inter-
state commerce from acquiring the stock or share capital of other
corporations where it had the effect of substantially lessening com-
petition or of tending to create a monopoly. In December, 1950, this
act was amended" to add to its prohibitions the purchase by cor-
porations subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
of the assets of other corporations engaged also in commerce. Texas
has, under some circumstances, prohibited the acquisition of one cor-
poration of the stock and physical properties of another corporation."
Circumstantial Evidence and Conscious Parallelism
The biggest Texas antitrust case of all" (the judgment, not includ-
ing costs or interest, was a fine of $1,623,900) was to some extent
based on circumstantial evidence." Federal antitrust cases have also
been predicated on circumstantial evidence. 8 There does not appear to
be any reason why circumstantial evidence should not suffice. Other
cases, civil and criminal, can be proved by circumstances. But the
circumstances should amount to greatly more than similar action or
conscious parallelism.
Particular attention should be called to the circumstantial evidence
rule in conspiracy cases. While conspiracies are expressly prohibited
by the Sherman Act," conspiracies against trade"0 are directed prim-
arily against agreements to boycott, refusals to buy or sell, etc. The
4338 STAT. 731. 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1952).
"64 STAT. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1951); see also McElroy, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and the Oil Industry, 5 BAYLOR L. REV. 121 (1953); Carson, Corporate
Mergers, 1952 ANTITRUST LAW SYMp'osUM-1952, p. 167 (CCH).
"Art. 7427(2), TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. (1925); Art. 1633, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).
4Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State. 106 S.W. 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) error ref.
" See also 9 TEx. JuR., Conspiracy § 21 (1941); 18 TEx. JUR., Evidence-Criminal
Cases § 317 (1939); 17 TEX. JUR., Evidence-Civil Cases § 409 (1939).
4American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265
(1942); United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 389 (1948).
4926 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1-3 (1952).
" Art. 7428, Tax. REV. CiV. STAT. (1925).
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Texas statute on trusts5' is directed against trusts as an actual com-
bination of capital, skill, or acts.
The questions in these cases usually are: (1) what kind of evidence
can be admitted; (2) what inference can be drawn from this evi-
dence; and (3) the quantum of evidence necessary to prove such
issues as combination, monopoly or restraints of trade.
Conscious parallelism in its more virulent form has been rejected
by the United States Supreme Court" and has also been rejected by
the Texas Supreme Court."
Interstate versus Intrastate Commerce
Manufacturers and marketers in Texas are caught between the
expanding universe of interstate commerce and a continuous, rigor-
ous enforcement of Texas state antitrust laws. Such manufacturers
and marketers, to preserve any semblance of a sense of security, must
view every single one of their acts as though they were subject both
to the state and federal antitrust acts, even though this is an ap-
parent legal impossibility.
Some attention must be given to the specific wording of the
statutes involved and to the cases construing them, respectively, such
as "in commerce," or "in the flow or stream of commerce."
While we may not expect one over-all operation to be subject both
to the antitrust laws of a state and the federal government, it is not
unlikely to suppose that some local and preliminary aspects of a
single transaction may be subject to state antitrust laws and other
and ultimate aspects of it to be subject to federal antitrust laws.
The difficulty is the unlikelihood of a definitive case. The state courts
will likely find the act to be intrastate commerce and the federal
courts will likely find it to be interstate commerce.
Labor, Agricultural, and Other Exemptions
As stated by Toulmin, "the general public has the impression that
only the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts are
to be considered in connection with monopoly and restraint of trade;
this is error." As a matter of fact, an entire volume of Toulmin's
treatise on antitrust law 4 is devoted to related and collateral pro-
visions of the antitrust laws of the United States. There are more than
"
1Art. 7426, TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. (1925).
"2 Theatre Enterprise's, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U. S. 537 (1954).
2 5 Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. State, -..- Tex .------. , 280 S.W. 2d 723 (1955).
64 3 Tou MiN, THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1949).
(Vol. IlI
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thirty other federal statutes which must be read in connection with
possible antitrust questions."
Since 1914 our federal laws have exempted labor, agricultural or
horticultural organizations where instituted for mutual help and in
lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects." The cases have cov-
ered secondary boycotting, violence, intimidation, price fixing by
labor organizations, and amicable and external restrictive agreements
between labor and management. Our Texas antitrust acts have also
exempted agricultural and labor organizations.57
In addition to other amendments, 8 the Texas Penal Code"6 was
amended in 1947 when the legislature provided for what has been
commonly called the Right to Work Act or the Anti-Racketeering
Act. In Texas, whether by injunction or criminal prosecution, illegal
activities of labor unions have been before the courts of Texas in the
larger cities almost monthly.
Single Trader-Bathtub Conspiracies
In the ordinary affairs of life it has been understood that it takes
two to combine or conspire. Can a corporation conspire with itself?
Can its officials conspire in an intramural venture? Can the parent
conspire with a wholly-owned subsidiary? May the affiliates
conspire with themselves? Though strong arguments can be made
for single trader in federal cases, these arguments so far have been
rejected. "° Bearing in mind the particular wording of our antitrust
laws, we have some peculiar facets of this theory in Texas."' One
writer has dealt with relations with affiliated customers."
" C. C. H., THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 5-63 (1949); ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM-
1950, p. 107 (CCH).
:638 STAT. 713 (1914), 15 U.S.C. S 17 (1952).
'
7 Arts. 1642, 1644, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).
56 Arts. 1634, 1644, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).
59 Art. 1621b, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).
60 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United
States v, Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 496 (1948); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab. Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947);
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); United States v. New
York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 173 F. 2d. 79 (7th. Cir. 1949); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d. 376 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 579 (1941);
but see Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F. 2d. 911 (5th. Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); Marion County Cooperative Ass'n. v. Carnation Co., 114
F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
61 State v. Fairbanks-Morse & Co., 246 S.W. 2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
.. r.e.




Choosing Customers and Refusal to Deal
The right to choose customers or to refuse to sell certainly exists
in the abstract. The practical exercise of this right shades into trouble-
some questions. At least the Colgate doctrine6 has never been over-
ruled. In fact, the Colgate case has just been cited, apparently with
approval, in a recent opinion of the Supreme Court." Assuming no
combination, no conspiracy, no public utility, no operation affected
with the public interest, no monopoly, no tie-ins, no negative cov-
enant, no condition and no full-line forcing, an ordinary wholesale
druggist ought to be able to choose his customers or refuse to further
deal with a price cutter.6 We do have the benefit of the thinking of
the Department of Justice.6 Part of the Robinson-Patman Act67 ex-
pressly recognizes the right of a seller to select his own customer "in
bona fide transactions." The Supreme Court of Texas in the Ford
Motor Co. case,6" stated without qualification that there is nothing in
our laws that requires the manufacturer to sell, and that he can sell
or refuse to sell at his pleasure.
Exclusive Dealing
In this age of assembly-line production, such as automobile pro-
duction and continuous-run, multi-products refining, there must be
a constant source of raw materials and an assurance that the manu-
factured product can be immediately disposed of. Long-term con-
tracts not only give assurance of supply and disposition but they
assist in price-hedging and advance cost accounting. One-year con-
tracts may be legal and five-year contracts may be illegal. 9 It can be
stated positively with fair certainty that exclusive dealing between
one individual and another individual is legal where the contract is
limited to one geographic location, is for a reasonable period of time,
achieves ordinary business ends, occasions no monopoly in fact, and
produces no unreasonable restraint in trade.70 The essential elements
"'United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
64Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 334 U.S. 594 (1953).
65 But even a one-man refusal to deal, coupled with other acts, may be a boycott under
the Sherman Act. United States v. N.Y. Great A&P Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
66 Timberg, The Rights of Customer-Seller Selection, BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, 1951 SYMPOSIUM, p. 151 (CCH).
6749 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13A (1952).
6Ford Motor Co. v. State, 143 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 230 (1943).
69Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392
(1953).
" Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922 (1952); Standard Oil Co. of Calif.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Mathews, Texas Antitrust Laws, INSTITUTE ON
ANTITRUST LAWS AND PRICE REGULATIONS, pp. 19, 50 (Sw. Legal Foundation 1950); ANTI-
TRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM-1950, p. 43 (CCH). It should be noted that the current case of
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are so many that in any event there remains some hazard in exclusive
dealing.
Exclusive dealing becomes especially questionable when there are
many dealers involved and a substantial part of the market is fore-
closed to competition.
Particular attention should be given to the nature of the com-
plaint against exclusive dealing, whether under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, or Section 2 of the Sherman Act, or Section 3 of the
Clayton Act, or Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The same is true of the Texas Antitrust Act, whether the suit is
brought under Article 7426 or Article 7428.
As to the parties in Texas who are amenable to our antitrust laws
in exclusive dealing contracts and the function that they occupy not
only in the industry but as related one to the other, the current
Fairbanks-Morse case' must be read in detail. In interpreting and
applying our Texas antitrust statutes the Fairbanks-Morse case stands
for this: (a) the combination of capital, skill, or acts contemplated
by Article 7426 must be in relation to articles or commodities of mer-
chandise, produce, or commerce; (b) Article 7428 contemplates an
agreement by two concerns both of whom are, at the time in question,
engaged in buying or selling, and it does not apply when one of the
parties is the ultimate consumer; and, (c) Article 7426 applies only
to a combination of competitors which might have been other-
wise independent and competing.
Entire Output and Requirements Contracts
Output and requirement contracts are closely related to exclusive
dealing and perhaps a part thereof, but the Portland case"' in Texas
is of current and extreme importance. The Texas Supreme Court up-
held this entire output contract as against an attack for alleged
-want of mutuality and for alleged violation of Article 7428 of our
statutes. It is noteworthy that the Cox case"3 was cited with approval.
There is a current American Law Reports annotation, "Restrictive
agreements or covenants in respect of purchase or handling of petrol-
eum products by operator of filling station," 4 which concerns in part
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 334 U.S. 594 (1953), apparently cites
with approval FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), and Pick v. General
Motors Corp., 299 U.S. 3 (1936).
71 State v. Fairbanks-Morse & Co., 246 S.W. 2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref.
n.r.e.
72 Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., 150 Tex. 533, 243 S.W. 2d 823
(1951), 30 TEXAS L. REv. 524 (1952).
"Cox, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 16 S.W. 2d 285 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
14Annot., 26 A.L.R. 2d 219 (1952).
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the frequent challenges to these contracts on the basis that they are
in restraint of trade at common law or within the provisions of anti-
trust statutes.
Relations with Resellers
In Texas many manufacturers continue to be unaware of the fact
that their products cannot be "fair-traded" in this state. The dividing
line is when title passes or whether title passes. Prices can be con-
trolled if the distribution is through an agency or consignee, with
title remaining in the manufacturer or primary distributor and with
the agent or consignee merely the physical medium through which
delivery is made.
Where title is passed, any attempt by the manufacturer to fix,
maintain, or control prices or allocate territory in the State of Texas
is per se illegal.
On the other hand the manufacturer still has at stake the good will
involved in the product bearing his name or trade-mark, even
though title is passed, and some relations may still be maintained, even
in this state."'
The 1953 Antitrust Law Symposium of the New York State Bar
Association has two learned articles on allied problems."8
Consent Decree
Of the civil cases instituted by the United States, a great majority
of them were settled by consent decrees." Many hundreds of stipu-
lations have now been entered into with the Federal Trade Com-
mission. 8
The leading case on consent decrees in federal antitrust proceed-
ings is Swift and Company v. United States."8
Only some ten years ago it was considered proper by the De-
partment of Justice to institute both criminal and civil proceedings
and dismiss the criminal proceedings if a consent decree would be
agreed to; or to file a civil suit and threaten the defendant with ad-
"'Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 230 (1943); Texas Co. v. Wheat,
140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W. 2d 632 (1943); Coca Cola Co. v. State, 225 S.W. 791 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1920).
7 Hodson, The Manufacturer's Right to his Dealer's Loyalty, p. 186; Dean, Supervision
of Selling, p. 201.
" CCH, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (1949); CCH TRADE REG. SERV., p. 1521 el
seq. and p. 15,001 et seq.
78 CCH TRADE REG. REP., p. 41. 101 et seq.; CCH TRADE REG. SERV., Id.
79276 U.S. 311 (1928).
(Vol. I1I
ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS
ditional criminal proceedings unless he or it entered into a consent
decree."0 The practice was both unfair and unjust.
But once the consent decree in the federal court is entered into it is
very difficult for a defendant to obtain a modification of this
decree,"1 even though it may be ambiguous and contains a "potential
lawsuit in every word." 1
Though no formal system of consent decrees exists in Texas,
nevertheless, two of our most important antitrust cases were finally
disposed of by an "agreed judgment" and a "consent decree," and
the nature and character of such decrees were so styled and as such
enforced by the Austin Court of Civil Appeals.8 The ratio of the
state cases disposed of by agreement, whether formal or informal,
is about the same as the percentage of federal cases actually disposed
of by consent decrees. It is a fact that nearly all of the penalties
imposed in civil antitrust suits in the district courts at Austin are in-
herently agreed or consent decrees--even though the state goes
through the routine of introducing evidence en masse-because in
fact and in nearly every instance there are no real, contested, and
actually adversary proceedings.
3 D's-Dissolution, Divorcement and Divestiture
In addition to injunction, dissolution, divorcement and divestiture
may be decreed in civil federal cases where necessary to put an )end
to the combination or conspiracy or to deprive the defendants of the
fruits of their conspiracy, where necessary to render impotent the
monopoly power, and where necessary to restore competitive con-
ditions in the market."
Sometimes a fourth D is added-that of "Disaffiliation." One of
the early and leading cases employed this additional equitable relief."'
Dissolution is expressly provided for in our Texas civil antitrust
statutes'" and was actually employed in an early and leading Texas
case. 7
80 Cahill, The Sherman Act and Big Business, ABA SECTION oF ANTITRUST LAW 1952,
p. 26.
" Note, 63 HARV. L. REv. 320 (1949).
12WOLBERT, AMERICAN PIPE LINES 163 (1952).
"
3 State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W. 2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref.; State v.
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 263 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) error ref.
046 TOULMIN, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 972 (1949).
:5 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 '(1910).
8 ' Art. 7430, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925).
87 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) error ref., aff'd,
212 U.S. 86 (1909).
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Suggested List or Retail Prices
Price suggestions take varied forms, such as separate price lists,
prices quoted in national advertising, or flat prices printed on pack-
ages or containers. Troublesome problems arise where there are no
fair trade contracts in jurisdictions which would otherwise permit
them, or, as in Texas, where no fair-trading is allowed at all.
Probably mere suggestions are valid in any instance, but mere
suggestions tend to become pressure, remonstrances, warnings, threats
and sanctions. The greater the pressure on the retailer to maintain
list prices, the more stringent become the measures adopted to police
price cutting and the more dangerous become refusals to deal.
It will be assumed that such attempts at control are something less
than common law control, but common law control is not necessary
to give rise to antitrust proceedings. We certainly know that this kind
of activity may give rise to chain store tax cases in Texas under our
chain store tax law." A recent case on this phase was decided in
Texas."
Savings or Disclaimer Clauses
Savings or disclaimer provisions have also been called "bootstrap"
clauses. A provision, however, which merely agrees to do a certain
thing "in so far as it is lawful . . . to so agree . . ." on its face con-
constitutes no agreement to do the thing mentioned if it is unlawful
so to do."
Similar provisions have been litigated where usurious interest was
involved."'
These clauses must be read in connection with a provision of our
state antitrust laws" which provides that any contract or agree-
ment in violation of our antitrust laws shall be absolutely void and
not enforceable either in law or in equity.
Foreign Parent Corporations-Domestic Subsidiaries-Voting Stock
and Control as within Antitrust Laws
Foreign corporations without a permit to do business in Texas
have, under Article 1533a, express authority to own and vote stock
in a Texas corporation, and participate in the management and con-
88Art. 1llld, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).
"'Sharp v. J. R. Watkins Co., 250 S.W. 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
"°Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 230 (1943). See also Patrizi v.
McAninch, 258 S.W. 2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), rev'd and rendered, 153 Tex. 389, 269
S.W. 2d 343 :(1954).
" Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W. 2d 1046; 109 A.L.R. 1464 (1937).
92 Art. 7437, TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925).
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trol of the business and affairs of Texas corporations, as other stock-
holders:
Voting stock and participating in management of domestic cor-
poration. That when any foreign corporation without a permit to do
business in this state lawfully owns or may lawfully own or acquire
stock in Texas corporations, it shall not be unlawful for such foreign
corporation to vote said stock and participate in the management and
control of the business and affairs of such Texas corporation, as other
stockholders, subject to all laws, rules and regulations governing Texas
corporations, and especially subject to the provisions of the Antitrust
Laws of the State of Texas. Acts 1925, 39th Leg., ch. 185, p. 455,
Sec. 1.
The plain terms of this statute give foreign corporations, by such
ownership, the same rights (but no greater rights) as other stock-
holders. Note especially the concluding clause dealing with the anti-
trust laws.
The control of Texas corporations for more than seventy-five
years has been vested in Article 1327:
The directors shall have the general management of the affairs
of the corporation.
There are two leading cases in Texas where the domestic sub-
sidiaries were able to continue their existence because they had main-
tained their own integrity:
State v. Humble Oil d Refining Co.:"3
These officers are in complete control and management of the
business of appellee, Humble Oil & Refining Company. The testimony
does not disclose any effort on the part of the Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey to exercise, control, or manage appellee ...
State v. Swvift b Co.:94
Does the evidence show that Swift through such stock ownership
actually dominated and controlled Consumers so as to be in fact
itself engaged in the cottonseed oil mill and gin business in Texas
without a permit to do so? The trial court found that it was not so
engaged, and we hold that the evidence adduced sustains such finding.
Stated differently, the trial court held that the separate corporate
identity of Consumers had not been ignored by Swift under the facts
adduced on the trial of the case. ...
Doing business questions and antitrust questions as between foreign
parent corporation and domestic subsidiary tend to become indis-
tinguishable.
13 263 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) error ref.




A simple current example of the danger of negative covenants is
in Vann v. Toby." Toby sued Vann for actual and exemplary damages
for something less than $20,000, growing out of an alleged breach by
Vann of a partly written and partly oral contract for the sale of an
unpatented street marker. By an oral portion of these dealings, Vann
represented to Toby that if he would permit him to distribute the
street markers he, Vann, would not handle or distribute any other
street markers during the life of their contract. The Dallas Court of
Civil Appeals held that, because of this illegal portion, the entire con-
tract was void. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals would have upheld
the mere exclusive sales right to Vann, but the court went on to
emphasize that the illegal covenant not to handle competitive street
markers tainted the whole contract with this illegality.
Criminal Prosecutions
Though venue of both civil prosecutions and criminal prosecu-
tions is laid in Travis County," nevertheless in nearly fifty years only
three criminal prosecutions have been brought." They are referred to
above. The federal practice of jointly filing civil and criminal prose-
cutions was never utilized in this state.
Patents, Trade-marks, Trade Names, Unfair Competition
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Federal Constitution gives Con-
gress the following power:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.
Note that there is nothing said in the Federal Constitution about
trade-marks, trade names, unfair competition, secret formulas, trade
secrets, etc.
Though the federal courts very early held that legislation re-
specting trade-marks was not authorized by this clause,"9 it was
suggested that under the commerce clause perhaps Congress had the
power to legislate with reference to trademarks in interstate com-
merce. Thereafter, under the Act of 1881, Congress did legislate and
provide for registration of trade-marks "in commerce."
Notwithstanding, there is language in the so-called Coca-Cola
Is260 S.W. 2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
"Art. 7431, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. (1925); Art. 1641, TEx. PEN. CODE (1925).
97 FINTY, ANTITRUST LEGISLATION IN TEXAS 31 (1916).
"Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 94 (1879).
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Company case" which has plagued cautious lawyers for more than
thirty-five years:
The owner of a patent right, copyright, or trade-mark, having
the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the article protected thereby,
and being under no legal obligation to grant such right to another,
may impose upon his assignee such restrictions as he may see proper,
and to which his assignee will agree, including the price at which the
article may be sold, the territory in which it may be manufactured and
sold, the material that may be used in its manufacture, or in con-
nection therewith.
The Coca-Cola case was cited with approval by the Waco Court of
Civil Appeals in Shaddock v. Grapette."°
Doubt is now thrown on the Coca-Cola case by the Supreme Court
of Texas in Patrizi v. McAninch, °5 in which a contract dealing with
a patented machine was held to be within the Texas antitrust laws
even notwithstanding the presence of the so-called "bootstrap" clause.
The Coca-Cola case was merely mentioned in one sentence: "We do
not interpret Coca-Cola Co. v. State ... as holding to the contrary."
In the words of law schools, we would "put a big question mark
after the Coca-Cola case today."
The Lanham Act ' itself is applicable to "a trade-mark used in
commerce."
Administrative Enforcement and Treble Damages
Texas has no administrative enforcement similar to the Federal
Trade Commission, nor does our state antitrust law provide for
treble damages.
Minerals-Pooling, Unitization, Processing, and Joint Operations
Pooling, unitization, processing and joint operations were made
for the purpose of conservation, prevention of waste, and adjust-
ment and protection of correlative rights in the production of oil
and gas. Most ordinary pooling, unitization, operating, and pro-
cessing contracts, even in the absence of federal or state legislative
sanction or administrative immunity, are accepted as valid."0 ' In
:9Coca-Cola Company v. State, 225 S.W. 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
100259 S.W. 2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
10' 153 Tex. 389, 269 S.W. 2d 343 (1954).
10260 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1952).
103 HARDWICKE, ANTITRUST LAWS, ET AL. V. UNIT OPERATION OF OIL OR GAS POOLS,
Searls, Antitrust and Other Statutory Restrictions of Unit Agreements, THIRD ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 63 (1952); Errebo, Unit Operation at
Cotton Valley: An Alleged Violation of the Sherman Act, 24 TUL. L. REv. 76 (1949);
United States v. Cotton Valley Operations Committee, 77 F. Supp. 409 (W. D. La. 1948).
See also press release of Attorney General Tom C. Clark, dated June 17, 1947, and his
letter of August 31, 1947, to Earl Foster, Executive Secretary of the Interstate Oil Coin-
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fact, the attitude of most state conservation commissions, as typified
in the order of the Texas Railroad Commission shutting down the
whole Spraberry Field until all the casinghead gas was put to a legal
use and not flared (even though the Supreme Court has just held it
void), means that these joint operations must be undertaken
voluntarily and co-operatively. Oil and gas do present these "thorny
problems" and we may well expect the federal courts, at least, to
adhere to somewhat of a hands-off policy. °s
Texas does provide for permissive but not mandatory pooling or
unitization.' with these explanatory and qualifying clauses:
No such agreement shall provide, directly or indirectly, for the
co-operative refining of crude petroleum, distillate, condensate, or gas,
or any by-product of crude petroleum, distillate, condensate or gas.
The extraction of liquid hydrocarbons from gas, and the separation of
such liquid hydrocarbons into propanes, butanes, ethanes, distillate,
condensate, and natural gasoline, without any additional processing
of any of them, shall not be considered to be refining.
No such agreement shall provide for the co-operative marketing of
crude petroleum, condensate, distillate or gas, or any by-products
thereof.
No provisions of this Act shall be construed as requiring the approval
of the Commission of voluntary agreements for the joint develop-
ment and operation of jointly owned properties.
Nothing herein shall restrict any of the rights which persons now
may he to make and enter into unitization and pooling agreements.
The approval of any such agreement shall not of itself be con-
strued as a finding that operations of a different kind or character
in the portion of the field outside of the unit are wasteful or not
in the interest of conservation.
Exhausting First Administrative Remedies-Primary Jurisdiction;
Regulated Industries
In this day of administrative controls over railroads, aviation,
power, motor carriers, radio, television, farm crops, communication,
shipping, pipe lines, conservation of natural resources, etc., can there
be antitrust law violations when the act complained of is done pur-
suant to such administrative controls? Or, if this act complained of is
pact Commission. Hardwicke, ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS,
23 TUL. L. REV. 183 (1948).
.. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan Oil Co., 152 Tex. 439, 259 S.W. 2d 173
(1953).
'Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943); Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941)-but the
pending "Pacific Coast" antitrust case does not bear out some of this optimism. State and
federal questions on joint refining and marketing arc open.
'"Art. 6008b, TEx. REV. Csv. STAT. (1925).
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subject to the actual or potential jurisdiction of the administrative
agency, should not the powers of the administrative agency be first
invoked for a ruling? This last question can be answered "yes" with
some force and certainty. The federal cases, however, do not decide
these questions with quite the same force and certainty." ' This re-
quirement is in the process of evolution and development and has
received some recent treatment in legal periodicals.' An analogy can
be drawn to the abstention applied by some federal courts where
equitable relief involves state laws. There is almost no state antitrust
authority on the question involving state statutes and state boards."'
Pleading
In Texas an indictment under our state antitrust laws must in-
form the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him and
must contain the constituent elements of the offense and every fact
or circumstance necessary to a complete description. Perhaps a crim-
inal indictment in Texas must be more elaborate than an indictment
or information under the federal antitrust laws because Texas
allows no bill of particulars under our Code of Criminal Procedure
and the various methods of discovery under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure have not been adopted as yet in Texas.
The petition in civil antitrust suits instituted by the state usually
includes a count for an injunction and a count for a penalty. Peculiar
rules are applicable to both of these counts, which are succinctly sum-
marized by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in State v. Fairbanks-
Morse Co.:"'1
The State's antitrust suit for final injunction and penalties (against
Fairbanks-Morse, $50 to $1,500 per day from January 1, 1938 to date
17 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Georgia v. Penn. R.R.,
324 U.S. 439 (1945); United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S.
474 (1932); Consolidated Gas E. L. & P. Co. v. Pennsylvania W. & P. Co., 194 F. 2d 89
(4th Cir. 1952); Putnam v. Air Transport Ass'n of America, 112 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. N.Y.
1953); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104 (W. D. Wash. 1952); Apgar
Travel Agency v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D. N.Y. 1952);
Slick Airways v. American Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 199 (D. N.J. 1952); Interstate Natural
Gas Co. v. Southern Calif. Gas Co., 102 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Calif. 1952); Isbrandtsen Co. v.
United States, 96 F. Supp. 883 (S.D. N.Y. 1951), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub
nom. Rederi v. Isbrandtsen Co., 342 U.S. 950 (1952); McClellan v. Montana-Dakota Utili-
ties Co., 95 F. Supp. 977 (D. Minn. 1951).
'1°Note, 64 HARv. L. REV. 1154 (1951); 66 HAv. L. REv. 158, 1124 (1953); Elmer
A. Smith, The Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 14 ICC PRAC. J.
181 (1946); 101 U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1953); Note, 28 IND. L. J. 194 (1953).
'O'But see Board of Ins. Comm'rs. v. Sproles Freight Lines, 94 S.W. 2d 769; and
see Searls. David T., The Antitrust Laws frot the Viewpoint of a Private Practitioner,
INSTITUTE ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PRICE REGULATIONS 11, 71, 108-109 (Sw. Legal
Foundation, 1950).
1.0246 S.W. 2d 647, 654 (1951).
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of petition, June 9, 1948) is for all practical purposes a criminal action
and subject to the same rules of strict construction. Ford Motor Co.
v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S. W. 2d 230; also subject to the stringent
rule of pleading applicable to injunctions "that 'the averments of
material and essential elements must be sufficiently certain to negative
every inference of the existence of facts under which petitioner would
not be entitled to relief;' " Powell v. City of Baird, Tex. Civ. App.,
132 S. W. 2d 464, 468; the petition, in other words, being nowise aided
by presumption or intendment.
Illegality of Contracts in Violation of Antitrust Law
Article 7437 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes provides:
Any contract or agreement in violation of any provision of this
subdivision shall be absolutely void and not enforceable either in law
or equity.
Doubtless this legislation is probably declaratory of the existing
common law and not basically different from results reached in cases
arising under the federal antitrust laws. Certainly Texas cases have
read into this statute not only the common law itself but to a great
extent a rule of reason."'
Miscellaneous-Trade Regulations Law
Texas has not availed itself of the federal McGuire Act and con-
sequently has no fair trade law. Texas did not have any sales-below-
cost or unfair competition legislation prior to the enactment of a
"Sales Limitation Act," applicable to grocery stores only."' There
is nothing in the civil portion of the Texas antitrust laws analogous
to any part of the federal Robinson-Patman Act.
Trade Associations
Only a dozen or so of the trade associations, out of the thousands
which have existed, have ever been convicted of any illegal activity.
This is at least as good a record percentagewise. Most of these few
cases were instances of reckless behavior, such as price fixing, division
of markets, elimination of competition, group action against price
cutters, boycotting, and other instances of per se violations under
any theory. There has grown up a mass of literature which can
assist in separating the legal from the illegal in the activities of these
associations."'
"ll Breckenridge, Some Phases of the Texas Antitrust Law, 3 TEXAS L. REV. 335 (1925);
4 TEXAS L. REv. 129 (1926); Nuttimg, The Texas Antitrust Law; A Post Mortem, 14
TEXAS L. REV. 293 (1936).
11 Art. 11im, TEX. PEN. CODE (1925).
.. Hawkins, Trade Association Practices: Lawful and Unlawful, INSTITUTE ON ANTI-
TRUST LAWS AND PRICE REGULATIONS 173 (Sw. Legal Foundation 1950); Rugg, Trade
Associations, ANTITRUST LAW SYMpoSiuM-1952, p. 145 (CCH); Hote Select Committee
(Vol. I1I
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The Texas cases have touched on this problem occasionally." '
In fact, trade associations were the nuclei of allegations of com-
bination, conspiracy, or group activity in two of the most im-
portant antitrust cases filed in recent years, each of which involved
the petroleum industry.11
ENFORCEMENT
At least until recently, the story has been told and retold in Texas
that our attorneys general have filed more antitrust suits and col-
lected more moneys under Texas antitrust laws than did the Attorney
General of the United States in all the states and under all the federal
antitrust statutes. Whether or not this is literally true is beside the
point, but probably the statement can be made safely that the state
antitrust laws of Texas are more vigorously enforced by state of-
ficials than antitrust statutes of any other state.
In the space allotted no detailed study can be made of Texas' en-
forcement of its own antitrust laws except to refer to three existing
studies, namely, (1) Finty, Antitrust Legislation in Texas; (2)
Mathews, "History, Interpretation, and Enforcement of Texas Anti-
trust Laws" in Institute on Antitrust Laws and Price Regulations 19-
70. (S.W. Legal Foundation 1950); and (3) Report of Antitrust In-
vestigations and Litigation of the Administration of Honorable Price
Daniel, former Attorney General of the State of Texas, 1947-1952,
inclusive, prepared for use in the 1953 Fall Antitrust Clinic, Dallas
Bar Association.
The last-mentioned report summarized reveals that as many as
one tkousand preliminary investigations of alleged antitrust viola-
tions have been made by the office of Attorney General of Texas
during the period 1947-1952 involving almost every conceivable com-
modity from clothing, soap, cosmetics and razor blades, to chili
products and poultry feed, gasoline, automobile tires and air con-
on Small Business, Congress and the Monopoly Problem, Fifty Years of Antitrust Develop-
ment, 1900-1950, H.R. Doc. No. 599, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); Hays and Ratzkin,
Trade Association Practices and Antitrust Law, HARV. BUS. REV. (1947); TRADE AsSOCIA-
TION SURVEY (TNEC Monograph No. 18, 1941). For a bibliography of professional litera-
ture on trade associations, see A STUDY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 20 (TNEC Monograph No. 38, 1941). See also Trade Associa-
tion Cases, I CCH TRADE REGULATION SERVICE 1291. For a new directory of trade associ-
ations, see JUDKINS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1949); see also
OPPENHEIM, CASES ON TRADE REGULATIONS 113 (1936); and INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS (U. of Mich., 1953).
... Gulf Insurance Co. v. Gaddy, 129 Tex. 481, 103 S.W. 2d 141 (1937); Harris v.
Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Potomac Fire Insurance Co. v. State, 18
S.W. 2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error ref.
"'Arkansas Fuel Oil Company v. State, 154 Tex. 573, 280 S.W. 2d 723 (1955); State
v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Tex. 313, 107 S.W. 2d 550 (1937).
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ditioning equipment. Separate files were opened on 321 investiga-
tions, the facts in perhaps two out of three matters originally in-
vestigated not being deemed of sufficient importance to justify the
opening of a separate file. Since 1947 the Attorney General has filed
33 suits for antitrust violations, practically all of them involving price
fixing and territorial restrictions. In 1953 six of these suits were still
pending in the trial or appellate courts. In practically all of the others
judgments were rendered resulting in the assessment of penalties and
the granting of permanent injunction against the practice com-
plained of.
CONCLUSION
This paper might well conclude with some "Do's" and "Don'ts"
for lawyers with clients doing business in Texas.1 6
Don't tell your client to make an oral contract containing in-
valid provisions instead of a written one. It is true that an oral
contract is more difficult to prove in court than a written one. It
would follow that the parties would have more difficulty in estab-
lishing their rights under an oral contract; but this would not mean
that they would be immune from prosecution under the antitrust laws
as the statutes can be violated by an oral contract as well as by a
written one."7
Don't advise your client to control prices by written instructions
delivered to its customers from time to time, but not set forth in
the contract. In the case of Ford Motor Company v. State,"' the
Supreme Court held that if Ford pursued a general policy of de-
termining the prices which were to be charged for its product by its
dealers and then accomplished this result by a course of conduct de-
signed and intended for that purpose and calculated to accomplish
it, in so doing it had violated the antitrust laws just as effectively as
if it had accomplished such result by direct contract.
Don't advise your client to call its customers "sales agents" or
other such appellations in the hope that thereby they will be ex-
empted from the antitrust laws. Unless the contract is really one of
agency, calling it that will not help the parties."
Don't advise your client that no holds are barred in connection
with patented, copyrighted and trademarked articles. While the own-
-Acknowledgment is made to Mr. Sol Goodell for much of the material that follows,
taken from his paper delivered September 26, 1953, on The Texas Antitrust Laws before the
1953 Fall Antitrust Clinic of the Dallas Bar Association.
1
7 Vann v. Tobey, 260 S.W. 2d 114 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
". 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 230 (1943).
"' Texas Brewing Co. v. Anderson, 40 S.W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) error ref.
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er of a patent, copyright or trademark possesses many rights and
privileges not held by others, he is not exempt from the operation of
the antitrust laws, and has no more right than any other mana-
facturer to control the resale price of his products after he parts
with title. °
Don't advise your client to obligate his dealers to pay a "service
charge" for the benefit of the aggrieved dealer if he sells outside the
territory intended for him. It has been held that while this arrange-
ment on its face does not violate the antitrust laws, it might with
other facts and under certain conditions be evidence of a violation. 2'
Don't advise your client to put pressure on anyone else not to sell
or to deal with a competitor. Although every business can in the usual
situation pick its customers, it is unlawful to let someone else have
a hand in the selection.'
The best advice a lawyer can give a client doing business in Texas
is to forget, if it is possible, that there are such things as fair trade
laws, fair trade agreements, territorial restrictions, and exclusive deal-
ing contracts, to familiarize himself with the Texas antitrust laws
and the effect of the cases construing such laws, to realize that such
laws are generally enforced, and to abide by them.
Your client may not be satisfied with that advice. He may be, and
probably will be, "territory minded" and worried about territorial
mix-ups among his dealers. There is nothing to prevent him from
appointing as few dealers as he pleases, located in strategic spots,
just as he would if territories were fixed by contract. The chances
are his dealers, if they make money in handling his product, will take
the hint and stay out of the territories in which other dealers are
located. An occasional violation would not hurt anyone and would
serve as proof that no territorial restrictions exist.
Your client may have dealers who cannot remember where they
are supposed to operate and may insist on defining the territory of
each dealer. This is unwise, as with other facts it might be construed
as evidence of territorial restrictions. But if your client nevertheless
insists on it let it be merely a suggestion of the territory in which
the manufacturer expects the dealer to operate. This can be justified
on the grounds that the dealer desires an outlet for his product in the
specified area and that the manufacturer is entitled to be assured
that purchasers of his product in the specified area will receive
"'Breckenridge, Phases of Texas Antitrust Law (Part II), 4 TEXAS L. REV. 129, 141
(1926).
121 Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 230 (1943).
.. See Jax Beer Co. v. Palmer, 150 S.W. 2d 452, 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
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proper servicing, replacements and repairs. We would add to the
document outlining the suggested area a provision to the effect that
nothing herein (or in any other contract or instructions between the
parties) shall be construed as confining the dealer to the specified area
in the sale of his products, but it is expressly agreed and understood
that he shall be allowed to sell his products wherever he pleases.
Suggested resale prices are more difficult to justify. Stay away
from them altogether. Suggested prices (even with a clause similar
to that suggested above expressly recognizing the right of the dealer
to sell for any price he pleases), together with a provision for term-
ination upon notice could very easily be construed as an "intentional
course of conduct by the parties . . . enabling the seller to dictate or
control the resale price ...
Your client may wish to reconsider his marketing arrangements
in Texas in order to determine whether in the light of the restrictions
upon his operations he might better accomplish his purpose by
establishing bona fide sales agencies or by shipments on consignment.
The attorney should be familiar with all of the exceptions to the
Antitrust Act so that his client may take advantage of any appropri-
ate exceptions in making contracts with his dealers.
A helpful device, the so-called "disclaimer" or "bootstrap" clause
which has been used to great advantage in contracts that might other-
wise be usurious, ' might be of help in protecting against antitrust
violations.
In Ford Motor Company v. State,"' the contract under scrutiny
provided that "insofar as it is lawful for dealers so to agree," the
dealer would not resell Ford products at less than the established
retail prices and the Supreme Court held that "this contract pro-
vision, on its face, does not violate our antitrust laws. It only obli-
gates the dealer if it is lawful for him to be obligated. If it is un-
lawful, no obligation is assumed. If no obligation is assumed, no
violation of law is contracted for."
This provision may be used in doubtful cases. The writers do
not know whether it would be effective in cases where the contract
provides for a clear violation of the law.'
123Ford Motor Co. v. State, 142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 239 (1943).
124 Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W. 2d 1046 (1937).
...142 Tex. 5, 175 S.W. 2d 230 (1943).
2'"But now see Patrizi v. McAninch, 258 S.W. 2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), reversed
and remanded, 153 Tex. 389, 269 S.W. 2d 343 (1954).
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